Global Regulators Tighten Grip on Stablecoins as GENIUS Act Takes Shape
Global stablecoin oversight crossed a threshold in February 2026 as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) published its first comprehensive implementing rulebook for the GENIUS Act , converting a landmark July 2025 statute into enforceable supervisory standards. From Seoul to London to Basel, central banks and financial watchdogs are converging on a common conclusion: privately issued digital money demands the same institutional scrutiny as the banking system it threatens to bypass. The OCC Rulebook: Banking Rules for the Digital Dollar On February 25, 2026 , the OCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) establishing a dedicated regulatory section, 12 CFR Part 15 , for entities it classifies as Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers (PPSIs) [1]. The proposal operationalises the GENIUS Act, which President Trump signed into law on July 18, 2025 as the first federal statute to directly regulate digital assets in the United States. The Act defines a "payment stablecoin" as a digital asset designed for use as a means of payment, backed by a fixed amount of monetary value, and issued exclusively by an authorised entity. The OCC's rulebook goes further, imposing minimum capital thresholds, liquidity buffers beyond token redemption obligations, formal governance structures, and explicit third party risk management requirements on prospective issuers. In short, launching a stablecoin will now resemble applying for a bank charter rather than shipping a software product [1]. The reserve framework is central to the proposal. All PPSIs must maintain 1:1 reserve backing in high quality liquid assets, a list that is strictly enumerated to include cash at the Federal Reserve, short term U.S. Treasury securities, qualifying repurchase agreements, and certain money market funds [1]. Riskier instruments such as bitcoin, gold, and secured loans are explicitly excluded from the eligible reserve list, a direct response to concerns raised by critics about the deteriorating quality of Tether's USDT collateral. The OCC further proposes that at least 10% of reserves be held as demand deposits at a Federal Reserve Bank, with a weighted average maturity cap of 20 days for the broader portfolio [1]. A 60 day public comment period is open, covering more than 200 discrete questions, making stakeholder engagement unusually consequential for the final calibration of the rule. "Stablecoin issuance is being prudentialised, not lightly regulated. The proposal places payment stablecoins squarely within a bank like supervisory framework emphasising reserve integrity, capital adequacy, liquidity discipline, and governance." [Gibson Dunn analysis of the OCC NPRM, March 2026] South Korea: Banks Only, AML First Across the Pacific, the Bank of Korea (BOK) is pushing a structurally conservative position. In a formal report submitted to the National Assembly's Strategy and Finance Committee on February 23, 2026 , the central bank reiterated its recommendation that won denominated stablecoin issuance be restricted exclusively to licensed commercial banks [2]. The BOK's position rests on three pillars: banks already operate under strict capital adequacy requirements and anti money laundering (AML) frameworks; non bank issuers would introduce oversight complexity and systemic vulnerability; and privately issued stablecoins could enable users to convert won into dollar pegged assets, bypassing South Korea's capital flow management measures [2]. The urgency of the BOK's caution was sharpened by an operational incident this month at crypto exchange Bithumb , which erroneously transferred approximately $40 billion worth of so called "ghost" Bitcoin to clients. BOK Governor Rhee Chang yong has stated that "currency operates on trust, not technology," citing the 2022 Terra/Luna collapse and USDC's temporary de pegging as evidence that institutional backing is non negotiable. The central bank has also proposed a bank centred consortium model requiring banks to hold at least a 51% equity stake in any stablecoin issuing entity. The Financial Services Commission (FSC) has pushed back, arguing that such rigidity could stifle fintech participation, leaving South Korea's Digital Asset Basic Act delayed well into 2026 [2]. Bank of England: The Singleness Problem In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England published a working paper on February 27, 2026 , examining what it calls the risk to the "singleness of money" posed by the proliferation of private digital currencies [3]. Author Benjamin Hemingway models the conditions under which monetary cohesion could break down if stablecoins issued by competing private entities fail to maintain a reliable 1:1 exchange rate among themselves and against central bank money. The paper concludes that singleness is "an equilibrium outcome shaped by institutional design, market structure, and policy choices," not a guaranteed property of any particular technology architecture. Without robust convertibility guarantees and regulatory oversight, fragmentation of the money supply becomes a material risk, one that the BoE regards as incompatible with financial stability. | Regulatory Jurisdiction | Key Action (Feb 2026) | Core Mechanism | Status | | | | | | | United States (OCC) | NPRM under GENIUS Act | 1:1 reserves, capital, 120 day licensing | Comment period open | | South Korea (BOK) | National Assembly report | Bank only issuance, AML first | Legislation delayed | | United Kingdom (BoE) | Working paper published | Singleness of money risk modelling | Policy formation stage | | Bank for International Settlements | SEACEN Policy Summit speech | USD stablecoin systemic risk framing | Advisory | BIS and the Dollar Stablecoin Question The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) added a macro systemic dimension at the SEACEN Policy Summit in Kuala Lumpur on February 5, 2026 , where Bank Negara Malaysia Governor Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour warned that USD backed stablecoins, if widely adopted, could intro…